The Influence of Party Affiliation on Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission by Molloy, William Thomas
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1971 
The Influence of Party Affiliation on Decisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission 
William Thomas Molloy 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Molloy, William Thomas, "The Influence of Party Affiliation on Decisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission" (1971). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624737. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-mxks-eh30 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
THE INFLUENCE OF PARTY AFFILIATION ON 
DECISIONS OF THE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE COMMISSION
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Government 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
APPROVAL SHEET
Approved,
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts
William T. Molloy
t It■£/l
James M, Roherty, Ph.D.
ck D. Edwards, Ph.D.
Joseph AvJMiri, Ph.D.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......... ................... ................ iv
LIST OF TABLES......................... .. v
ABSTRACT............................... ....................... vi
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
CHAPTER II. POLITICAL INFLUENCES . . . . .  .......... . . . . .  11
CHAPTER III. RESEARCH DESIGN  ................ 28
CHAPTER IV. EVALUATION................................... .. . 39
APPENDIX.  ..............   51
A* List of Cases Studied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52
B: Biographical Material on the Commissioners
Studied. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ............ 62
BIBLIOGRAPHY.  ...........     77
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer wishes to express his appreciation to the committee 
under whose guidance this study was conducted, especially for their 
careful reading and constructive criticisms of the manuscript.
A special word of appreciation is reserved for Mr. Clark D'Elia, 
graduate assistant programmer, and Mrs. Virginia A. Jones, computer 
operator, both of the computer center at the College of William and 
Mary. Without their technical assistance in the development of a 
program to process the data, and the arduous work of keypunching the 
data cards this study would have taken much longer to accomplish.
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Patronage Positions at the ICC .  .............   « . . 16
2. Differences in Decision Scores of Republican and
Democratic Commissioners to the Standard
Democratic Responses by Issue Category . . . ........ 38
3. Proportion of Contrary Decisions by Republican
and Democratic Commissioners by Issue Category . . . .  41
4. Relationship of Attributes and Contrariety to
Party Policies . . . . . .  .................  . . . . .  45
v
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine, if possible, the 
effects of party affiliation on the decisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. The effects were determined by comparing the 
voting patterns of the individual commissioners in five categories of 
decisionmaking with standard positions constructed from the Democratic 
Platform Plank of 1956 on Transportation. Conformity with the 
standards were considered to be the Democratic position, while 
nonconformance with the standards were construed to be the Republican 
position. Partial concurrences and dissents were given a halfway 
value between the two positions.
From the data as processed it was found that there was no 
significant, correlation between party affiliation and any decision of 
the individual Commissioners. As a matter of fact, there seemed to be 
a.high percentage of the decisions which were contrary to the assumed 
party positions. Further study revealed that this contrariety tended 
to be associated with Commissioners who had previously held public 
office and who had had legal training.
THE INFLUENCE OF PARTY AFFILIATION ON 
DECISIONS OF THE INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE COMMISSION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Interstate Commerce Act, recognizing the position of the 
Commission as an agency enforcing and interpreting public policy, 
provides that not more than six of the eleven commissioners shall be 
appointed from the same political party.^ History records the fact 
that the fixed, overlapping terms of the commissioners, the bipartisan 
composition, and the vague guarantees of tenure were incorporated in 
the original legislation to insure that the Commission would be 
independent of the executive. While the requirement for ‘'balance” of 
members with different party affiliations was aimed at preventing 
“packing,” experience has shown that these safeguards do not protect 
against public Instruction by the President, congressional ire, or 
budgetary controls imposed by either or both.
It was not until the Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy of the 
1930s that recognition was given to the fact that there were political 
pressures both from within the government and from outside that could 
present a challenge to the "independence” of the Commission. The
-^Statutes at Large, XLIX, at ,481.
^Harvey C. Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 141-43.
2
3political pressures, as observed, took one of two forms. First there 
were those who sought to influence the adjustment of controversies on 
the horizon, or in the actual process of determination. Second, 
there were those who sought to mold the general course and direction 
of regulatory policy through manipulation of the appointing power. 
Those who thought to apply such pressures were assuming, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that the Commission was a part of the 
administration and was, therefore, a legitimate medium for the 
expression of partisan political policy.
Since 1920 there have been several incidents involving the 
executive branch which were calculated to embarrass the Commission in 
its free exercise of control. President Harding urged his views 
privately on at least one of the commissioners concerned with the 
postwar rate adjustments, while President Hoover, on at least two 
occasions, publicly expressed his support and approval of positions 
which he thought proper in cases then in hearing before the 
Commission.^
There were also incidents of undue emphasis on political 
considerations in the choice of appointees during the Coolidge years. 
The tactics involved in political wirepulling of this type, when 
sectionalism becomes involved, tends to generate partisanship and
I^. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission: A Study
in Administrative Law and Procedure, Vol. II (New York: The
Commonwealth Fund, 1931), p. 453.
^'Ibid. , pp. 455-56.
4extend the influence of the appointing and confirming authorities.
Even the long tradition of the renomination of effective commissioners 
was violated in the Senate of the 70th Congress, 1st Session because 
of a single decision on the part of Commissioner Esch, and not on the 
grounds of malfeasance or nonfeasance.^
Some legislative enactments have also been calculated to
*
affect the scope of jurisdiction and the range of functions and 
activities of the Commission. Examples were the Hoch-Smith Resolution 
on special rates for agricultural products, and the various bills 
seeking to abolish the Pullman surcharge authorized by the Commission 
in 1925.6
In a 1935 opinion the Supreme Court expressed the feeling that 
the members of the Interstate Commerce Commission were called upon to 
exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts ". .' . appointed
by law and informed by experience." The Court went on to imply that, 
despite the fact that the Commissioners were appointed by the head 
of the party in power, and administered laws passed as the result of 
political decisions, they must act with complete impartiality in the 
public interest.^ Since the Commissioners are members of an adminis­
trative tribunal sharing the executive function of administering and
^Ibid., pp. 461-62.
^Sharfman cites Statutes at Large, XLIII, at 801 and 95 
ICC 469 as examples at p. 465.
^Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602.
5implementing stated legislative purposes, they must adopt the posture
of executives acting within a policy framework and not that of judges
deciding impartially between adversaries. While both an executive
and a judge use the same essential materials of decision, the
executive's use of the evidence is far more subjective than the
judge's. The executive must exercise a greater degree of discretion
and apply more value judgment in the application of statute law to
concrete situations and in enunciating policy according to his
expert knowledge and the best of his belief.^
The real cause of this diffusion and sharing of executive
responsibility in the Federal Government is to be found in such
basic political factors as ccngres-sional-presidential rivalries, the
decentralization of political parties, the absence of responsible
party government., and the prevalence of particularistic interests in
this country. The so-jcal.led "independence" of the regulatory
commissions is, therefore, only a symptom of the phenomenon and not
9the proximate cause of the diffusion according to Bernstein.
If this is so,, then what difference does the makeup of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission make? Do the individual commissioners 
let their political philosophy, as evidenced by their party
^Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior; A Study of Decision 
Making Processes in Administrative 0rganiza11.ons (New York:
Macmillan Co., Inc., 1954)
^Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955),
pp. 168-69.
6affiliation, influence their vote on cases heard before them?
Political scientists of the past twenty years have found no concrete 
evidence that any political pressures have influenced the Commission 
as a whole, but most of their data boil down to expressions of opin­
ion rather than fact. Of course these tendencies, symptoms and causes 
are not always evidenced in the public record and are not easily 
appraised today by reference to precise and dogmatic standards.^
Since no group of human beings can be.completely objective 
under such pressures, it is the purpose of this writer to find out 
how much subjectivity is evident in the decisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission by comparing the voting patterns of the commis­
sioners on several issues of general transportation importance with 
the stated public policies of the two major political parties on the 
regulation of business in general, and the transportation industry in 
particular, as reflected in the party platform. The second purpose of 
this study is to disclose, if possible, what attitudes and beliefs of 
the commissioners may be adduced from their voting patterns. In a 
word, how consistent are they in their decisions?
The Approach of the Study 
Schubert cites three theoretical approaches available for
f-
such research into judicial decisionmaking; the traditional, the
conventional, and the behavioral. Although these three are not 
mutually exclusive, the writer chose to subordinate the traditional
lOsharfman, op. cit., pp. 452-77.
7and conventional approaches in favor of the behavioral approach for 
several reasons. First, the traditional theory seeks consistencies 
among output norms; second, the conventional looks for any observable 
consistencies in patterns of interaction between the commissioners and 
the other actors in the procedural process. Only the behavioral 
approach focuses upon the consistencies in the patterning of individual 
sets of values, consistencies between individual sets of values, and 
consistencies among an individual's inputs, his values, and his out­
puts. In short, the traditional theory deals with output relation­
ships: the conventional with both input and output relationships; and 
the behavioral with the input, conversion, and output relationships.
The demands of the litigants which the Commission perceives 
not only as "objective content," but also as functions of the status 
of the litigants and the competence of the practitioners who present 
the cases, will be considered as the inputs to the process. Whatever 
the direction of the response by the Commission, it is likely to be 
more intense when the arguments for an issue are reinforced by the 
advocacy of a recognized practitioner who is experienced in 
interacting with the Commission and its staff. A second general 
source of inputs derives from the lower echelons of the Commission 
which initially reacted to the demands. Disagreement over conclu­
sions as to the application of law to fact leads to the appeal 
procedure which involves the Commission en banc. A third source of 
inputs is the record of the case, the briefs, petitions and the oral 
arguments presented to the Commission. There are the facts in the
8case and those of the case. The former consist of a description of 
the events that led up to the conflict of interests between the 
litigants and the position of the interveners. The events that 
transpired in the preliminary administrative adjudication, including 
the actions of the hearing examiners, boards, and divisions of 
the Commission are the facts of the case. Then there are the 
inputs by the critics of the Commission, i.e., Congressmen and 
Senators acting as individuals, executive suasion, judicial 
prerogative, statements by professional societies, testimony by 
^industry associations, et cetera.
^ By conversion is meant that subprocess by which issues are
‘recognized and decided as the result of group interaction, the. 
^integration of value-judgments of the individual commissioners, the 
^'shared perceptions of policy, and the factual questions raised by the 
|tlitigants. Both issues and values are dynamic inputs which through 
the conversion process become the outputs of the policymaking system. 
The values may change slowly with time for the acquisition of values 
are a part of the socialization process, but the demands and issues 
may fluctuate widely.
Schubert also shows that there are three major attitudinal 
components of ideological liberalism and conservatism, namely those 
affecting the political, economic and social outlooks of the judges 
involved. Since the Interstate Commerce Commission is structured 
with a judicial framework as an administrative tribunal, it would 
be reasonable to assume that the same ideological components affect
9the outlook of the commissioners. A political liberal on the 
Commission would tend to place emphasis on the rights of employees of 
carriers and the public which they serve. A political conservative, on 
the other hand, would favor the status quo with regard to regulatory 
matters. An economic liberal would believe in and support a more' 
equal distribution of the profits, and better services at less cost.
An economic conservative would defend private enterprise, protect 
vested interests, and uphold the broad differential in wealth and 
income between management and labor. A social liberal would be pre­
disposed toward individual personal rights of employees and clientele, 
but toward collective property rights. A social conservative would 
lean toward collective personal rights, but insist on. individual 
property rights.
Schubert's study found a high degree of rationality in judi­
cial decisionmaking consisting primarily of a psychological 
structuring of attitudes in the minds of individual judges, rather 
than of a logical structuring of rationalizations for outcomes as 
expressed in written opinions. There is every reason to believe that 
a similar level of rationality may be found in the decisionmaking 
within the Interstate Commerce Commission because of the judicial 
aura with which the agency has been endowed from its inception.
It is further suggested that the rationality may be attributed to 
the attitudes of the decisionmakers toward policy issues, and not 
in other cause-and-effect relationships between decisions and
10
output norms.^  ^
The attitudes of decisionmakers toward policy issues often 
parallel their political affiliations, but the predilections to which 
members of judicial bodies and administrative tribunals respond will 
not necessarily be evinced in either their written opinions or in the 
records of the cases heard. There are many other influences acquired 
during early education, and work experience, such as political 
influences in the broad sense, educational backgrounds, and partisan 
political policies which an administration will seek to implement. 
Since all of the.se will affect the output of the Commission to seme 
degree, they must be explored before a viable conclusion can be 
arrived at.
One factor which may be quantitatively measured and which 
rrefkects the attitude of individuals is the voting pattern on a 
.^ sufficient number of cases involving specific issues so as to be 
statistically significant. By mathematical techniques these quanti­
tative measurements can serve as indicators, but the attributes and 
influences which lead up to these voting patterns must be identified 
before any interpretation may be attempted.
l^GIendon Schubert, The Political Role of the Courts: 
Judicial Policy-Making (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1965), pp. 120-25.
CHAPTER II
POLITICAL INFLUENCES
Historically sponsors and reformers of American regulatory 
commissions have had a rather naive view of the political processes in 
a democracy. For instance, the advocates of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission insisted on keeping it out of the hurly-burly of politics, 
and in the hands of capable and expert men who would protect the 
public interest unencumbered by political influences. This bias of 
Progressive political thought which was prevalent in the first decade 
of this century was combined with the legalistic emphasis on adjudica­
tion by the legal profession which resulted in the sad misconstrual of 
the regulatory process by proponents of the "independent” commission. 
They were unable to understand the true nature of the. problem which 
the Commission would face.
As Bernstein explained:
The process of regulation is unavoidable political. So long 
as regulation is conditioned by the general political and social 
environment, and remains founded on the efforts of organized 
groups to utilize public power to promote either private ends or 
the public welfare, it will remain a major aspect of political 
life. It is political not in the image of progressive reformers, 
that is corrupt, fraudulent, dishonest, and motivated by desire 
for private gain. Politics refers rather to the emergence of 
public issues, formulation of public policies, and administration
11
12
12of governmental affairs.
It would, therefore, be no surprise to find that there is 
political influence exerted on the Commissioners of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. The question is from what sources and to what 
degree the influences will be apparent.
Presidential Influence 
By the very act of making appointments a President becomes 
engaged in a political act, and his appointments are going to reflect 
his own political policies to a greater or lesser degree.
Herring relates that Wilson's appointments were often 
criticized on the grounds of policy, while Harding accommodated 
friends and associates. With Coolidge questions of qualifications 
were clearly subordinated to political considerations. Bernstein 
also agrees with Herring that it is shortsighted to look upon 
politics as a malevolent force since the problem is much more funda­
mental. Politics in the broad sense simply cannot be separated from 
national policy, but what is reprehensible is the political inter­
ference which is petty, personal, and partisan. For instance, the 
manner in which Harding and Coolidge controlled their appointees by
^2-Marver h . Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1955),
pp“. 71-73,” 258.
13
the subterfuge of retaining an undated letter of resignation was
13clearly unethical.
According to Cushman, all presidents from Wilson to
Franklin D. Roosevelt have attempted to influence the activities and
policies of the Commissions in one Xvay or another.^ Even the
Progressive Reformer, "Teddy" Roosevelt, did not hesitate to call two
Interstate Commerce Commissioners to the White House to discuss a
pending case with the President of the New York, New Haven, and
Hartford Railroad Company, while President Hoover used the technique
of issuing a public statement on the outcome of a case on the
Commission's docket to influence a favorable decision.
Franklin D.. Roosevelt attempted to oust a Commissioner from the
Federal Trade Commission who displeased him, but he did not succeed.
The Commissioner, Humphrey, died before the litigation was concluded,
but the executor of his estate carried the case to the Supreme Court
where it was decided that a commissioner could only be removed for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, but not'for
1 fireasons such as political expediency or convenience.
13E. Pendl eton Herring, Federal Commissioners: A Study of
Their Careers and Qualifications (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1936), pp. 77-79.
^Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 681-85.
•^Bernstein, op. cit. , pp. 110-11.
■^Humphrey's Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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Political Party Influence
The question of why there should be political interference with
the inner workings of the Interstate Commerce Commission could be
answered rhetorically, ’’Why not?”. Superficially both questions are
too obvious, but as one goes deeper, one becomes too involved with
human nature to obtain a simple answer.
The political influence takes many forms, some of which are
inevitable. One type results from the fact that many prominent party
functionaries outside of the government are also lawyers and practice
before the Commission. Then there are the officeholders and aspirants
at the state level who contribute much heat, but not much light,
through fiery oratory and campaign pledges about sectional disputes
being heard before the Commission. Lastly, there are those seekers of
1 7patronage positions within the regulatory organization staffs. '
When Executive Order Number 10440 of March 31, 1953, amended 
the Civil Service Commission's Rule VI, three new classes of excepted 
positions were added to the list of patronage jobs. The Commission 
was also authorized to reclassify or add positions to the confidential 
or policymaking category upon recommendation of the agency concerned. 
The Eisenhower Administration by this move removed the patronage 
system from the centralized control of the Executive Offices at the 
White House and transferred the function to the Washington office of
^.Harvey C. Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), pp. 155-56.
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the Republican National Committee, which then became the clearinghouse
18for filling federal jobs not covered by the Civil Service System.
As the system worked in 1954, Republican Senators, Congressmen, and
state patronage managers recommended applicants to the National
Committee which forwarded the recommendations to the appropriate
agencies. Each department and agency was supposed to notify the
National Committee monthly of their vacancies in noncovered positions,
19and weekly of their appointments.
When the Democrats reassumed control in 1961,
.Lawrence F. O’Brieui was named Special Assistant for Personnel and 
-Congressional Relations which in effect made him the patronage boss of 
the new regime. The combination of personnel and congressional rela­
tions responsibilities and the assignment of O'Brien to the Executive
■Staff in the White House underlined the intent of the Democrats to use
20patronage as lever to promote Kennedy's programs. This intent was 
reinforced during the Johnson years when yet another group of 
positions were placed in the exempt category, the noncareer executive
18U.S., President, Executive Order No. 10440, "Amendment of 
Civil Service Rule VI," Federal Register, XVIII, 63 (March 31, 1953), 
1823.
^New York Times, October 28, 1954.
^New York Times, January 3, 1961.
16
assignments.21
The effect of both of these Presidential actions on the 
Interstate Commerce Commission is shown in Table I.
TABLE 1
PATRONAGE POSITIONS AT THE ICC
Year Exempted Position Title Number
1953 Confidential Assistant to each
Commissioner 11
1954 Managing Director3 1
1965 Congressional Liaison Officer3 1
1968 Confidential Assistant to the
Managing Director 1
1969 Congressional Liaison Assistant 1
1970 Secretary to the Congressional
Liaison Officer _1
Total: 16
a'Indicates Noncareer Executive Assignments
Congressional Influence
Beyond the power to create an independent regulatory agency
•such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Congress can and does
exercise a continuing oversight with respect to all of the regulatory
•
agencies. First, there is the technique of supplemental enactments,
2-^ U.S., President, Executive Order No. 1.1315, "Amending the 
Civil Service Rules to Authorize an Executive Assignment System for 
Positions in Grades 16, 17, 18 of the General Schedule," Federal 
Register, XXXI, 225 (November 19, 1966), 14729.
17
such as the Hoch-Smith Resolution of 1925, and the National 
Transportation Policy of 1940, which direct the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to pursue certain specific policies under certain circum­
stances. Second, there is the budget and appropriations process 
which affords an opportunity for Congress to tangibly express 
approval or disapproval of the work of the Commission. Third, there 
is the direct technique of legislating members of a Commission out of
office, as occurred to members of the Federal Tariff Commission in
2 ?  ■ - 1930. " A fourth technique is reserved to the Senate by virtue of
their position in confirming all initial appointments and reappoint­
ments. In 1 9 2 8  Commissioner Each of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission fell victim to this type of action because influential 
members of the Senate felt that his inconsistent voting in the Lake
Cargo Coal Controversy was the result of political interference,
23although no proof was ever found.
Besides the positive influences that Congress can wield, 
there is also a negative influence of limiting the discretionary 
powers of the President in removing members of a commission from 
office. If he can remove them, the President can control the 
commissioners. If he cannot, then the confirmation by the Senate is 
the last word. How far the power of Congress extends in restricting 
the removal power of the President has been outlined in two landmark
22statutes at Large, XLVI, at 590, 696 (1931). 
2%lansfield, op. cit., pp. 178-83.
18
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cases decided by the Supreme Court. The results are somewhat 
ambiguous and disappointing in that the scope of the removal power 
depends on the character of the office in question. The question of 
whether Congress can make a commission completely independent by 
denying the President authority to remove members for cause remains 
unanswered.
From the viewpoint of the Commission, good rapport with the 
legislators is imperative for survival, and the commissioners and 
career administrators strive to socialize committee members, 
especially the chairmen, to their agency's point of view. It is also 
essential that the agency reciprocate by providing technical help and 
information. to Congressmen and Senators on a quid pro quo basis.1 
The resulting influence which the legislators exert individually 
(party aside) is different from that which members of the committees 
of interest in the Congress exert in their official capacities. In 
the latter case the members are concerned with public policy and 
decisionmaking which the Commission must administer, while in the 
former the legislators are involved with particularistic interests of 
their geographic, or technical interest constituencies. The effect on
^Meyers y. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); and Humphrey's 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
25cushman, op. c.it., pp. 448-61.
“^Francis E. O’Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public 
Policy (Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1969),
pp. 24-31.
19
the decisions of the Commission is likely to be greater where the 
public interest is concerned than where personal concerns are 
involved. The relative power of the lawmakers in either case is a 
matter of seniority, the relationship between the individual and the 
Commission, or the subject matter under consideration. It cannot be 
attributed to some intrinsic characteristic of their personality.^
The reach for influence by individual members of Congress has 
even included the time-honored prerogative of handling patronage with 
special reference to the top appointive, posts and those sensitive 
policymaking positions not subject to civil service tenure restric­
tions, Schedule C jobs.^
Frequently one hears of an independent regulatory body 
referred to as "an arm of Congress," but this does not describe a 
legal relationship and cannot be used as an argument, for the 
existence of such a body. While it is true that such delegated 
powers as ratemaking are legislative in nature, they are of the 
"sublegislative" variety and are subject to review. Furthermore, 
there never has been a delegation of tasks to any independent agency
27Andrew Hacker, "The Utility of Quantitative Methods in 
Political Science," Contemporary Political Science, ed. by 
James C. Charlesworth (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 136-37.
^For some recent examples of Commissioners who owe their 
appointments to such fortuitous circumstances see Appendix B, 
biographical material on: William I. Lee, Walter M. W. Sp'lawn,
Charles A. Webb, Robert W. Minor, Paul J. Tierney, and 
George M. Stafford. All, at one time or another, were on the staffs 
of Congressmen, Senators, or Committees of one or another of the 
Houses of Congress.
20
that could not just as well have been performed by an executive officer. 
Thus in true perspective the independent regulatory agencies are 
separate institutions of government sharing some of the powers of all 
three branches.
Educational Backgrounds
In 1936, Herring conducted a study of the careers of the 
Federal Commissioners of the past, and looked into many of the factors 
and qualifications which were part of their educational backgrounds.
The data which he compiled led him to make the following generali­
zation:
The extremes [ of educational experience ] stress the great 
unevenness in the formal training of the men who have come to our 
commissions. . . . One hundred twenty-six commissioners attended
public high schools. Only eleven men were educated at private 
academies, and the select private preparatory schools are 
conspicuously absent.29
Herring's data on the forty-three Interstate Commerce 
Commissioners appointed up to that time shows that 49 per cent had 
undergraduate degrees, 14 per cent had graduate degrees, and that 
7 per cent attained doctorates. Of twenty-seven with legal 
experience, 21 per cent had studied law privately, 9 per cent had 
some law school experience, while 30 per cent had received their 
LL.B. degrees.
Of the nineteen commissioners whose backgrounds were
^^Herring, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
^^Ibid., Append ix C, p. 109.
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researched for this study 10 per cent stopped their education at the 
high school level, 85 per cent attained undergraduate degrees, and 
5 per cent received a graduate degree. Seventeen of the commissioners 
had legal backgrounds (89 per cent), fourteen had LL.B.Vs (74 per 
cent), one had a graduate degree (5 per cent), while two held 
doctorates (10 per cent). Other background information is included 
in Appendix B data.
Part of the educational background of the commissioners 
included in this study was the development of their concept of' 
politics and what party affiliations they made. In this regard, it 
was assumed that they would have followed in general the image that 
the'-public had at that period in time.
Party Platforms and Policies
The public image of the Republican and Democratic policies on 
regulatory matters during the period when most of the commissioners 
included in this study were just beginning their careers has been 
clarified by some of the data collected by the Gallup Poll on 
presidential voting preferences. For instance, in a sample of 
presidential preferences in the 1936-1940 time frame with relation to 
the distribution of responses to the question, "During the next four 
years do you think there should be more or less regulation of business 
by the Federal Government than at present? . . 59 per cent of
2,386 Democratic stalwarts wanted as much, if not more, regulation, 
while 76 per cent of the Republican standpatters desired less.
22
Of voters shifting from a Republican preference, in 1936 to a 
Democratic preference in 1940, 51 per cent of the eighty-five respond­
ents favored more regulation, while of those 660 individuals whose 
preferences shifted from the Democrats to the Republicans 63 per cent 
desired less regulation. Among the 403 new Democratic voters, 57 per 
cent wanted as much, if not more, regulation, while 55 per cent of the
285 new Republican voters desired less Federal regulation of 
31business. “
-The traditional image of the Republican Party since the decade 
after the Civil War has been one of laissez faire economic policies 
when it came to regulation of business and industry. Even when the 
Progressive wing of the party under Theodore Roosevelt was in control, 
they were more interested in reforming the mechanics of government by 
such, devices as the direct election of senators, the direct primary, 
and the initiative and referendum than they were in the regulation of
business. This tendency has carried right down to the period under
, 3 2study.
The Republican platform of 1960 in commenting on transportation 
called for:
Continued improvement of our vital transportation network 
carrying forward rapidly the vast Eisenhower-Nixon national 
highway program and promoting safe, efficient, competitive and
31v. 0. Key, with the assistance of Milton C. Cummings, Jr.,
The Responsible Electorate (New York: Vintage Books, 1968),
pp. 44-56.
^^Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 34-39.
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integrated transport by air, road, rail and water under equita­
ble, impartial and minimal regulation directed to those ends 
[ emphasis added ] .33'
The Curtis Report on which the 1960 platform was based was a 
digest of the opinions of twenty-four experts. It placed stress on 
private enterprise,, private incentive, minimal activity by the 
Federal Government, increased tax concessions to business, et cetera. 
Then Vice-President Nixon expressed the view that as little government
O /
as possible was the most important principle of the Republican Party.
- The 1964 Republican Platform, while it made no specific 
reference to transportation, did commit the party to simplify regula­
tory requirements, to M. . . put an end to powergrabbing regulatory
actions-. . . ," to eliminate excessive bureaucracy, and
In all such matters relating to Federal Administration it 
" . will be the Republican way to provide maximum service for each 
- tax dollar expended, watchfully superintend the size and scope 
•of Federal activities and assure an administration always fair, 
efficient and cooperatively disposed toward every element of our 
competitive system. . . .35
Democrats have, ever since they espoused the Populist view­
point in the campaign of 1896, been advocates of regulation of 
business in the public interest. They have sponsored much of the 
basic transportation regulation and supplementary legislation such
33j£xrk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, National Party 
Platforms, 1.840-1964 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press,
1966), pp. 609-10.
3 4 . S e y m o u r  E. Harris, The Economics of the Political Parties 
(New York: Macmillan Co., Inc., 1962), pp. xx-xxv.
35porter and Johnson, op. cit.. , pp. 684-85.
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as the National Transportation Policy, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 
and Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Perhaps the best statement of
the Democrats toward transportation regulation is found in the
Transportation Plank of their platform of 1956 which reads:
Transportation: The public and national, defense interests
require development and maintenance, under the competitive free
enterprise system, of a strong, efficient, and financially
sound system of common carrier transportation by water, highway, 
rail and air, with each mode enabled, through sound and intelli­
gent exercise of regulatory powers, to realize its inherent 
economic advantages and reflect its full competitive capabili­
ties. Public interest also requires, under reasonable standards, 
the admission of new licenses, where public convenience may be 
served, into the transport fields. We deplore the lack of 
enforcement of safety regulations for protection of life and 
property under present Republican Administration, and pledge 
strict enforcement of such regulations.
The same trend of-thought may be seen in the Democratic platforms of
subsequent national campaigns and in later legislative actions by
which they sought to implement these principles. ° One might.thus
syllogize that the attitudes of the Democratic commissioners appointed
during the 1960s, who were acquiring an education and experience in
the late 1930s, favored more regulation, while the opposite would
be true of the Republican members.
Conditions for Effective Influence
i
Under what conditions can party leaders in and out of govern­
ment effectively influence the decisions of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission? Freeman specified that:
36Ibid., pp. 531, 610.
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Ideal conditions [ for effective influence ] would exist when 
the Administration and Congress are dominated by the same majority 
viewpoint; when they can point to a clear margin of public confi­
dence in election returns, in editorial comment and in public 
opinion polls; and when this sentiment reinforces the control of 
the Administration over the Bureaucracy and the control of the 
Congress over its committee personnel. Under such conditions, 
which are rare indeed, there would in fact be party government, 
and the decisions made in subsystems would be little more than 
reflections of the general political system.37
The fact that the Chief Executive and the Congressional 
Leadership both wear the same labels does not mean that they have the 
same "majority viewpoint," for the norm in this century has been for 
there to be a conservative and a liberal faction in both major 
political parties. At the beginning of the period here under study, 
Kennedy polled only 49.48 per cent of the popular vote in 1960, 
which made him a "minority11 president. The Chairmen of the 
Congressional committees, while all nominally Democrats, were chiefly 
from the conservative Southern faction of the party.
Nor was there a n. . . clear margin of public confidence in 
election returns” until Johnson ran on his own in 1964. Nevertheless, 
this margin dwindled by 1968. Even the editorial comment and the 
public opinion polls reflected the gradual loss of public confidence, 
and the presidency was ultimately lost to the Republicans in 1970.
As to the . . control of the Administration over the
Bureaucracy,1* this remained in the hands of the liberal faction of
J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process: Executive
Bureau--Legislative Committee Relations (Rev. ed„; New York: Random
House, 1965), p. 59.
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the Democratic Party by virtue of the fact that the noncareer 
executive appointments were handled directly out of the Executive 
Office of the President during the Kennedy era. By contrast, the 
". . . control of the Congress over its committee personnel . . . ” 
remained with the conservative members of the party due to the 
seniority system which ensured that the long-tenured Southerners from 
one-party districts held the reins. The conditions during the period 
under study were, therefore, less than ideal for effective political 
influence on the Commission.
The opinions of Bernstein, Herring, Mansfield and others who 
have commented on the role that partisan politics played in the 
decisionmaking process of the Interstate Commerce Commission twenty, 
thirty and even forty years ago bolster a null hypothesis that there 
will be no differences between the Republican and Democratic members' 
views on regulatory matters. This assumption is further reinforced 
by Bernstein's observation that:
The lack of a close correlation of party affiliation and 
regulatory views should not be surprising. Frequently the 
President in designating a commissioner from the opposite party 
will select a man who does not represent the dominant views of 
that party. Franklin Roosevelt often appointed Republicans who 
were closer to the policy of his administration than many 
Democrats were. Moreover, as commissioners share their regula­
tory experience and influence one another, party differences on 
general economic policies come to have less relevance to 
day-to-day problems.38
Alternative hypotheses which would indicate a Democratic bias
38]3ernstein, op. cit. , p. 104.
in the decisions of the Commission were constructed around four 
general areas of regulatory interest to transportation mentioned in 
the Democratic Platform of 1956; i.e., franchises; finances and 
unifications; rates, charges, services, and their schedules; and 
enforcement of safety regulations. A fifth area of prior proceedings 
and judicial review was added to determine if the commissioners were 
upholding the work of their career employees, and if the Commission 
was taking action consistent with judicial opinions in matters 
reviewed by the. courts and remanded to the Commission for further 
action or consideration. How the attitudes of the individual 
commissioners were evaluated from the written decisions of the 
Commission is the subject of subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN
In 1961, Stuart S. Nagel of the University of Arizona wrote 
an article in the American Political Science Review in which he 
explored the empirical relationships between political party affilia­
tion and judges’ decisions as his primary objective. He selected 
298 state and federal supreme court judges, determined their party 
affiliations from appropriate biographical references, and then 
analyzed cases in fifteen typical major fields of judicial decision- 
making in which the judges had participated. Bis particular interest 
was to develop, if possible, an indicator for predicting how judges
on ^ bipartisan appellate courts would divide when they could not 
ao
agree. ^
Each judge was given a "decision score" by Nagel which 
represented the proportion of times that a judge voted for a specific 
class of litigant, i.e., defendant in criminal cases, administrative 
agency in business regulation cases, et cetera, cut of the total 
number of times he voted in that category. Where a judge did not 
vote clearly for either the plaintiff or defendant, particularly if he
39stuart Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges1 
Decisions," American Political Science Review, LX, 4 (December 1961), 
p. 843.
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concurred in part or dissented in part, he was given a one-half vote.
The data were then analyzed to determine what party affilia­
tion, if any, was consistently associated with decision scores above 
the average in each category of case. The probability of finding the 
observed differences between Republican and Democratic judges purely 
by chance, considering the number of judges in each category, was 
also computed to determine if any were statistically significant.
Nagel then sought to explain those relationships which were statis­
tically significant, although he admits quite frankly that several
S'; - ■ ■factors make the apparent definite correlations less than perfect.
Method  .
Using the Nagel article as a model, the writer sought to 
replicate the procedure, but with a smaller population, using the 
Interstate Commerce Commission as the object of research. Instead of 
fifteen areas of law, the author used four areas of general transpor­
tation issues in which the Commissioners would be involved in 
making quasi-judicial decisions, and a fifth area of prior proceedings 
to see how consistently the Commissioners applied public policy'and 
supported both their subordinate career employees and the courts of 
appellate jurisdiction. The period chosen for study was from 1960 
through 1967, because it was the most'recent period for which the 
bound volumes of Reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission were 
available. The cases were reviewed until a sufficient number in each 
category had been accumulated to provide a statistically significant
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population for computation.
One difficulty in operationalizing the Nagel method to an 
administrative agency such as the Interstate Commerce Commission was 
that the nature of the duties of the Commission were different in most 
cases from that of the courts of appellate jurisdiction. The latter, 
for the most part, are engaged in determining either the private rights 
of litigants in civil cases, or the guilt or innocence of defendants 
in criminal cases. Because of the adversary nature of court cases, 
Nagel was able, to state a definite position in each type of case as a 
standard of measurement.
Since there are more than two parties at interest, interveners, 
and public policy to be considered in administrative determinations, 
there cannot always be a dichotomcus situation from which to select a 
standard of measurement. This being the case, a series of positions on 
each of four general transportation issues, and the issue of precedence 
in prior proceedings were developed to establish a Democratic view­
point. This party was selected since they were nominally in charge 
of both the Congress and the Administration during the period under 
investigation. These positions were then used as a standard of 
measurement in the same manner as Nagel used his standard.
The four areas of general transportation interest selected 
were the matter of franchises; finances and unifications; rates, 
charges, services and their schedules; and safety regulation enforce­
ment* In the matter of franchises, the 1956 Democratic Platform 
stated: "Public interest also requires, under reasonable standards,
31
the admission of new licenses, where public convenience may be served, 
in the transport fields. . . ."
There is also an emphasis on "the competitive free enterprise 
system," and "full competitive capabilities." Therefore, the standard 
set of responses relative to franchises must reflect disapproval of 
requests for new franchises, or transfers or modifications of existing 
ones which would lessen competition, or which were not in the public 
interest. Conversely, the granting of new franchises, or the trans- 
ferral of existing operating rights to qualified applicants to 
increase competition and serve public convenience and necessity would 
meet the criteria. Included in the latter'group would be the granting 
of permission to agricultural interests and others meeting- the
provisions of the law to operate as exempt operations as provided by
40Parts II and III of the Act. Requests for the abandonment of lines 
or the discontinuance of services by railroads would be considered 
contrary to public convenience and necessity, or as an inability to 
meet competition and thus deserving of disapproval. The disciplining 
of operators who violate the terms of their franchises would be con- „ 
sidered as good public policy in the enforcement of the law.
With respect to finances and unifications, the Democratic 
tradition of rigid regulation of big business would militate against 
any reorganization plans designed for the benefit of the stockholders 
rather than the public. On the same basis, mergers, consolidations,
Interstate Commerce Act, Title XLIX, Statutes at Large, U.S. 
Code, Vol. Liv7se.cs. 304, 902 (1940).
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or acquisitions of control which are. designed to lessen competition 
and concentrate the financial control in the hands of a few would be 
subject to disapproval.
In the matter of rates, charges, services and their schedules 
the Populist view of reducing rates and. charges to a reasonable level, 
providing adequate services, and eliminating preferences, prejudices, 
and discriminations has long been considered by Democrats to be in the 
public interest. In this connection, the finding of violations of the 
law and regulations in rate matters, and the vigorous exercise of the 
ratemaking and rulemaking powers of the Commission would be taken as 
indications of ". . . sound and intelligent exercise of regulatory 
power S-. . .." In view of the preeminent position which the courts
have granted the Federal Government in the regulation of interstate 
commerce, the countermanding of actions by individual states in rate 
disputes would also be considered as "sound and intelligent" in the 
interest of uniformity and equity.
The strict enforcement of safety regulations would include the 
promulgation of standards and the investigation of accidents to 
ascertain proximate causes so that appropriate corrective actions may 
be taken to prevent recurrences.
In the review of prior proceedings, both those heard on 
petition and those remanded from Federal Courts, the affirmation of 
prior orders and reports of findings, or the taking of actions 
consistent with the opinions of the courts were considered to be in 
support of the career employee members of the subordinate boards and
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bureaus of the Commission, or in support of the Federal Judiciary. In 
either case it was considered to be the Democratic position during the 
period under study.
The standard responses against which the voting patterns in 
each case were measured follow:
Franchises:
a) Disapproving certificates and permits, modifica­
tions thereto, or transfers thereof when the applicant is:
(1) A railroad having an annual operating 
income of 3 billion dollars or more, or;
(2) A motor carrier having an annual operating 
income of 1 billion dollars or more.
b) Disapproving requests for abandonment of lines or 
discontinuance of service by railroads.^
c) Classifying an operation as an exempt, unregulated 
enterprise in accordance with the law.
d) Finding operators to be in violation of the law, 
their certificates or permits.
e) Granting certificates and permits, or transferring 
operating rights to qualified applicants other than those in a) above.
4-lxhe Interstate Commerce Commission has no authority to 
prevent abandonment of routes, or discontinuances of services by 
other carriers.
Finances and Unifications:
a) Disapproving financial plans submitted by fidu­
ciaries in corporate reorganizations to provide operating capital for 
continued operation of the business for the benefit of stockholders 
and creditors, rather than for other considerations.
b) Denying authority to issue additional securities
for any purpose.
c) Denying authority to assume obligations, liabil­
ities, and guarantees in connection with.mergers, consolidation of 
lines, or unifications.
d) Denying authority for sale and/or purchase of 
asset?, leases, operating rights, agreements, or securities between 
two or more carriers.
e) Finding mergers, consolidations, or acquisitions 
of control not to be consistent with the public interest.
Rates, Charges, Services, and their Schedules:
a) Countermanding actions of state regulatory 
agencies in matters of rate levels, rate structure, or service 
charges.
b) Exercising the ratemaking or rulemaking authority 
of the Commission.
c) Finding undue preference, prejudice, or discrim­
ination in rate cases.
d) Finding violations of the Act, or of the 
Commission's rules in connection with rate matters.
35
e) Denying requests for relief from the long- and 
short-haul provisions of Section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
f) Denying requests for specific or general rate 
level or charges increases.
g) Finding rates to be inapplicable, unjust, 
unreasonable, or otherwise unlawful.
h) Ordering changes to, or cancellations of 
schedules (tariffs), and/or operating agreements.
i) Finding violations of law and/or regulations in 
rate cases other than those mentioned above.
Enforcement of Safety Regulations:
a) Promulgating and enforcing rules, standards, and 
instructions on traffic control systems, safety appliances, and 
methods.
b) Enforcing paragraph (b) of Section 25 of the Act 
by not approving modifications to existing safety devices and systems 
which would lower the standards already set.
c) Investigating accidents and making determinations 
as to proximate causes and fixing responsibility.
d) Promulgating rules on the transportation of 
dangerous articles by rail and highway modes.
Prior Proceedings and Judicial Review:
a) Affirming prior orders and reports of findings in 
the same matters, which were administratively adjudicated by hearing 
examiners, employee boards or divisions of the Commission.
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b) Taking action consistent with the opinion of the 
court which remanded the case to the Commission for further consid­
eration.
Procedure
The data on the issues involved, the voting pattern of the 
Commissioners, the identity of the nonparticipants, and the division 
of the vote for or against the standard responses were extracted from 
the bound volumes of the Interstate Commerce Reports, coded and 
accumulated on keypunch card work sheets. Data cards were then 
keypunched, verified, and read into a computer. A program was 
developed which processed the data so that the cases in each category 
were arranged in descending order of vote division, and then chrono­
logically within each vote division. The program also recorded the 
number of times each commissioner voted in accordance with the 
standard, against the standard, or failed to participate on the case, 
as were the number of cases in which a seat was vacant. Sometimes a 
commissioner did not vote clearly for or against the standard, par­
ticularly if he concurred in part or dissented in part. On such 
occasions his vote was valued at one-half. For instance, in two of 
the cases remanded to the Commission by the Federal Courts,
Commissioner Stafford cast such halfway votes giving him a decision 
score of one out of a possible three, or .33.
The data was then analyzed to determine what party affiliation, 
if any, went consistently with a decision score above the average of
37
the Commission as a whole in each category of issue. For example, the 
question was asked whether the Democrats and Republicans differed in 
the proportion of those above and below average. The answer was 
arrived at in each instance by totaling all of the decision scores 
for all of the commissioners involved in cases of that type and 
arriving at an average. The separate scores of the Democrats and 
the Republicans were then classified as being above or below the 
average. Ry the use of the Fisher Exact Probability Test, as modi­
fied by Tocher, the probabilities that exactly this proportion of 
Democrats and Republicans would be found as being above the average 
decision score for the group was then computed, as well as the
probability that there would be an even more extreme distribution of 
/ o
proportions. The results of the test for the data used appear in 
Table 2.
42s. Siegel, Non-Parametrie Statistics for the Behavioral 
Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 96-104.
TABLE 2
DIFFERENCES IN DECISION SCORES OF REPUBLICAN AND 
DEMOCRATIC COMMISSIONERS TO THE STANDARD 
DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES BY ISSUE CATEGORY
■ ’ “ " “ " "■'■■■"
Number of 
Commissioners 
Involved
Repubs.
Above
Average
Demos.
Above
Average
Differ­
ence in 
Percent­
age
Categories Cases Repubs. Demos. (%) (%> Points
Franchises 79 5 8 80 38 42
Finances and 
Uni fication s 57 5 8 40 38 2
Rates, Charges, 
Services and 
Their Schedules 154 7 9 7 z 67 5
Enforcement of 
Safety Regula­
tions 54 6 8 50 38 12
Prior Proceedings 
and Judicial 
Review 152 7 9 86 56 30
Notes:
None of these proportions were statistically significant when 
the Fisher Exact Probability Test was applied.
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CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION
The authors of the original "Act to Regulate Commerce" 
conceived two devices to insure a decrease in the role of partisan 
influence on the decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The 
first was the bipartisan composition of the Commission and the second 
was the seven-year- term of the commissioners so as not to coincide 
with either the appointing presidential term or the confirming
A Q
senatorial terms. But, as Nagel points out in his article, where 
such devices are operative the members of tribunals have a greater 
tendency to vote contrary to their party patterns.^ To see if the 
same observation would apply to the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
a measure of "contrariness" was developed to determine the proportion 
of the commissioners who were voting against their party pattern.
For this analysis a commissioner was considered to have voted 
contrary to the tenets of his party if he were a Republican above 
(or a Democrat below) the average decision score of the Commission in
^Robert e . Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 61.
^Stuart S. Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges1 
Decisions," American Political Science Review, LX, 4 (December 1961), 
p. 848.
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the majority of categories in which he participated. Conversely, if a 
Republican were below (or a Democrat were above) the Commission 
average he was considered to have upheld his party's position. Using 
these parameters, Column 6 of Table 2 was changed to reflect the 
contrariety of the Democrats and the differences in percentage points 
and probabilities were recomputed. The result appears in Table 3.
The first thing that will be noticed is that in three of the 
five categories five Democrats always voted contrarily. Further 
investigation disclosed that it was not always the same five individ­
uals. One Republican voted consistently in favor of liberal posi­
tions, while another did so in the three, categories in which he 
partre ip ated*
Why so many of the commissioners of both political persuasions 
would'be voting contrary to their party's views may only be confirma- 
tionvof the observations in a study cn executives in government, 
sponsored by the Brookings Institution in 1957, that there is little 
or no concern with prospective appointee's political affiliations.^
The second observation is that in the category of Franchises, 
80 per cent of the Republican Commissioners were voting liberally for 
increases in the numbers of new competitors in the transportation 
field. (Over 80 per cent of the applications voted upon were in the 
motor carrier branch of the industry.) The Democratic members on the
■^5paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for Government: 
Central Issues of Federal Personnel Administration (Manasha,
Wisconsin: Brookings Institution, 1957), pp. 20-28.
TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF CONTRARY DECISIONS BY REPUBLICAN 
AND DEMOCRATIC COMMISSIONERS BY 
ISSUE CATEGORY
Number of 
Commissioners 
Involved
Re pubs.
Above
Average
Demos.
Above
Average
Differ­
ence in 
Percent­
age
Categories Cases Repubs. Demos. (%) (%) Points
Franchises 79 5 8 80 62 22
Finances and 
Unifications 37 5 8 40 62 22
Rates, Charges, 
Services and 
.Their Schedules 154 7 9 72 33 39
Enforcement of 
Safety Regula­
tions 54 6 8 50 62, 12
.Prior Proceedings 
and Judicial 
Review 152 7 9 86 44 42
Notes;
None of the above proportions were statistically significant 
when the Fisher Exact Probability Test was applied.
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other hand seemed to be seeking to restrain the competition in 
contrast to the party's position as stated in their platforms. The 
question of protecting existing carriers against competition has long 
been an important one and revolves around "public convenience and 
necessity" or "consistency with the public interest" on the one side, • 
and the fitness, willingness, and ability of the new applicants to 
perform the proposed service on the other. The burden of proof in 
both instances is on the applicant. A liberal or conservative vote, 
therefore, reflects the ability of the applicant to produce evidence 
that outweighs the objections of existing competitive carriers who may 
be, -and usually are, interveners in opposition to the application.
The category of Finances and Unifications dealt almost 
exclusively with railroads with only one or two cases involving 
transcontinental passenger carriers by highway. Since- all of the 
petitioners could be classified as "big business," it is not unusual 
to find only 40 per cent of the Republicans voting contrary to party 
pattern; but what is surprising at first glance is to find 62 per cent 
of the Democrats voting to support the mergers. The task before the 
Commission in these instances is to weigh the advantages of preserving 
the competition between independent carriers and the advantages 
"in the public interest," of improved service, lower costs and the 
like which may accrue from any particular consolidation. This, 
after all, is the Populist view so popular at the turn of the century 
and which the Democrats adopted.
The control of rates, charges and services was the prime mover
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in the adoption of the original "Act to Regulate Commerce." The 
traditional Populist view of lower rates and charges for improved 
services to small business, shippers and agricultural interests may 
account for the low order of contrary votes by Democratic Commissioners.
The large number of contrary votes by Republican Commissioners 
in support of the Democratic viewpoint is difficult to analyze since 
such an approach would reduce the revenue of the carriers involved 
thus reducing the profit margin. Such a stand would alienate the 
railroad industry, long a supporter of the Republicans.
The large contrary vote in matters of safety regulation 
enforcement may indicate that the Commission is administering laws 
which did not contemplate the wholesale abandonment of rail lines, 
curtailment of passenger services and the reduction of freight 
schedules which make some of the modifications to safety devices and 
systems feasible at this time. The Commission in applying adminis­
trative discretion may have compensated for some of the deficiencies 
in the law.
With regard to prior proceedings and judicial review, the 
statistics merely demonstrate the high regard the Commission has for 
the competency of its staff and. the integrity of the Federal 
Judiciary.
The phenomenon of contrariety in the decisions of the 
Commission was also investigated in relation to the limitations which 
Simon feels affects the ability of administrators to perform ration­
ally as decisionmakers. As Simon points out:
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On one side, the individual is limited by those skills, 
habits and reflexes which are no longer in the realm of the 
conscious. . . .
On a second side, the individual is limited by his values and 
the conceptions of purpose which influence him in making his 
decisions. . . .
On a third side, the individual is limited by the extent of 
his basic knox^ledge of things relevant to his job. This applies 
both to the basic knowledge required in decisionmaking--a bridge 
designer must know the fundamentals of mechanics--and to the 
information that is required to make his decisions appropriate to 
the given situation. . .
Evaluation of Backgrounds 
Since the skills, habits, reflexes and values are assimilated 
during childhood and adolescence, it would be almost impossible to 
•assess these attributes in each commissioner without detailed knowledge 
-of-his upbringing, something which is not available. The conceptions 
- of/purpose is one of the attitudes which this study seeks to arrive at 
by*;; comp arisen with a standard. The extent of the basic knowledge of 
things relative to the job of a commissioner can be determined by a 
survey of the backgrounds of the commissioners, particularly with 
respect to their higher education and early■employment.
To determine what part these background factors may have played 
in the pattern of contrariety, the sixteen commissioners under study 
were divided into two groups based on a series of attributes as 
indicated in the first two columns of Table 4. The null hypothesis in 
this case was that there would be no difference in the proportions of
^Herbert s imon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision
Making Processes in Administrative Organizations (New York: Macmillan
Co., Inc., 1954), p. 40.
TABLE 4
•RELATIONSHIP OF ATTRIBUTES AND CONTRARIETY 
TO PARTY POLICIES
Number 
In Each 
Group
Contrary 
Votes in 
Each 
Group
a>
Group I Group II (I) (II) (i) (ii)
49 years 
of age or 
younger at 
time of 
appointment
Over 49 years 
of age at 
time of 
appointment 10 6 60 66
Republicans 
appointed 
'by Democrats
Democrats 
appointed 
by Democrats 2 5 50 60
Republicans 
appointed by 
Republicans
Democrats 
appointed by 
Republicans 5 4 80 50
Reappointed
to
additional
term(s)
Appointed to 
partial or 
single 
terms 5 11 40 73
Elected to 
Chairmanship
Never elected 
as Chairman 8 8 63 63
Held public 
office
Never held 
public office 12 4 75 25
Appointed to 
public office 
and had legal 
training
Never appointed 
to public 
office and had 
legal training 10 4 80 25
Notes:
Every commissioner who held an elective public 
office also held an appointive office at some time.
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contrary votes cast by members of the two groups.
Age and position as Chairman of the Commission seems not to 
have made any difference in the proportions of contrary votes. The 
greatest impact seems to have come from Republicans appointed by 
Republicans, individuals who had both experience in public office and 
legal training, and those who were appointed to single terms. Only 
the public office experience and legal training are in any way 
indicative of a trend, for when the legal training factor is held 
constant, the percentage of contrary votes among those who had public 
office, experience rises by 5 per cent. None of the proportions are 
truly significant when the Fisher Exact Probability Test is applied.
It Is of further interest to note that the number of contrary 
votes among Democrats is highest among those who were appointed by 
Democratic Presidents, while the same phenomenon occurs with respect to 
Republicans appointed by Republicans. One might think that there is an 
overcompensation to ensure that the taint of partisan politics in the 
decisions is avoided, but in reading the written reports there was no 
evidence to support such a contention. The approach of David and 
Pollock that little attention is paid to political affiliations in 
making top-level appointments and the notion that such jobs as 
appointments to commissions are given to opposition factions within 
the administration party both have merit. ^  The truth in this case 
probably lies somewhere between the two.
^David and Pollock, op. cit. , pp. 20-28.
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Whether the 75 per cent of the members who voted contrarily 
lasted only one term because of their nonalignment with party policy 
is difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy, but 77 per cent 
of the Democrats failed of reappointment, while 57 per cent of the 
Republicans did not receive a second term. There are, of course, 
other considerations involved in the single term pattern. First, 
many "of the commissioners are able to make contacts in industry based 
on their position and when their term is finished, if not before, 
they are able to obtain more remunerative employment outside of the 
government service. Political vagaries within the seven-year span 
of the term make clearance of reappointments with party functionaries 
at the state.and national level a gauntlet not so easily run the 
second time around. Only those who make an outstanding contribution 
--to the work of the Commission, like Joseph P. Eastman or 
Kenneth H. Tuggle, are likely to be reconsidered.
The combination of experience in public office and legal 
training, which apparently strengthens the trend to contrariety, 
also has a bearing on the knowledge of things relevant to the job 
of commissioner, as well as to the basic knowledge required in the 
decisionmaking tasks. Only one commissioner, Rupert L, Murphy, had 
ever been actively employed as a transportation lawyer. The rest had 
been exposed to the technical problems of the transportation industry 
through their previous positions as members or employees of state 
regulation agencies, or, as in a couple of instances, as members of 
Interstate Commerce Commission Staff, or staffs of the appropriate
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Congressional Committees. This lack of basic knowledge of the 
economics of the transportation industry among the commissioners 
forces them to rely on the Commission staff, which also unfortunately 
has no professional economists. The only other source of information 
n. . . that is required to make his decisions appropriate to the
given situation . . .n is contained in the briefs and petitions which
are part of the legalistic and judicial environment of the Commission.
As lawyers, the commissioners have the requisite knowledge to 
apply the law to the facts, and as experienced public servants, some 
have the basic knowledge of the politics involved in executing public 
policy. This type of political action at the Commission level is 
basedj not so much on partisan considerations, as it is on the value 
judgment : of each individual commissioner as influenced by the 
substantiated facts in the evidence adduced in each case.
Conclusions
There were two purposes in mind during the research of the 
decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission; first, to determine 
what influence, if any, party affiliation of the commissioners had on 
their decisions, and second, what attitudes or beliefs could be 
deduced from their voting patterns.
When the relationships between political party affiliation and 
adjudicative administrative decisions turned out to be insignificant 
in the positive sense, an effort was made to see if there were a 
tendency to vote contrarily, which might account for the lack of
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positive correlation. This test too turned out to be statistically 
insignificant.
Aside from the fact that there may have been too few cases in 
the statistical population, there are many other reasons for such a 
lack of correlation between party affiliation and decisions on the 
issues involved. One of the most important factors, it is felt, 
derives from the fact that commissioners, like others, may have 
differing personal value systems yet belong to the same political 
party as those.who appoint and confirm them in office. A commissioner 
may. join one party rather than the other, and stay affiliated with it, 
not because of its stand on particular issues, but rather because it 
is :the dominant party in his geographical area, because his parents 
belonged to it, for ethnic reasons, or for various other reasons 
which do not necessarily involve a congruence of value systems between 
the individual and the party of his choice. Personal experience also 
has a great deal to do with the development of attitudes normally 
associated with "liberal" or "conservative" political views and 
values.
Attitudes may deviate in certain areas, as for instance when a 
commissioner with previous regulatory experience at the state level may 
be liberal on franchise issues, but may be a. stickler on rates. A 
conservative, by the same token, may favor large unifications, not 
because of his party affiliation, but because of some obtuse back­
ground element.
What must also be considered is the fact that the Commission
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in its actions operates both as an activity which expresses the will
of the Federal Government, and as an adjunct to the execution of that
will. In the former role there is not the latitude for the exercise 
of the discretionary powers that is afforded by the executive role.
The enunciation of policy is primarily the function of Congress as 
expressed through legislation. Here the Commission may recommend 
or interpret, but the recommendations may not come to fruition, and 
the interpretations are subject to judicial review.
The discretion afforded the Commission in the execution of the 
will of Congress extends to a determination of whether or not to recon­
sider a report of a lower echelon, to permit a reargument of a previous 
decision, or to authorize a rehearing in the matter. Simon points out:
Within the area of discretion, once an individual has decided
on the basis of his personal motives to recognize organizational
n objectives, his further behavior is determined, not by his 
personal motives, but by the demands of efficiency. . . . ^
This concept may very well apply to members of the Commission. 
The period of discretion for them occurs before a case is heard in 
reargument, or reconsideration, or rehearing. During the prefatory 
period the value system of the individual, which may account for his 
party affiliation, is operative in the decisionmaking process. Once 
the decision is made to hear the case ert banc then the demands of 
efficiency probably predominate. This may account for the low order 
of correlation found in the research.
^Simon, op. cit. t p. 204.
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LIST OF CASES STUDIED
095MCC0533PACIFIC MTR TRKG CO 
095MCC0710ICC IN RE MTR TRANS&AIRCF 
096MCC1503CENTL FRT LINES U E.TEX. 
096MCC1603ZUZICH TRK LINES-INVESTIG 
096MCC1960PRACTICES OF MTR CC OF HG 
096MCC2433TRANSAMERICANFREIGHT LINE 
09 6MCC 24 63LEONARD BROS TRSFR 
096MCC5 833NASHUA. MTR EXPRESS 
097MCC2063NATIONAL TRANSP CO-PURCHA 
097MCC4273MIDWEST BUS LINES-PURCHAS 
097MCC 7003BUCKINGHAM TRANSP INC 
098MCC1543BELAWARE EXPRESS CO-EXTN 
098MCC2623FISCHBACK TRUCKING CO 
098MCC3563E A GALLAGHER & SONS 
098MCC4830MTR CARRIER TEMPORARY AUT 
098MCC5103FROZEN FOOD EXPRESS 
098MCC5223J0S BALAZS SR-APPLICATION 
098MCC6073SOUTHWEST FRT LINES 
0 98MCC 6 813 EDDL EMAN BROS - APP.L ICATION 
098MCC7023LESTER C NEWTON
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09 SMCC 7123GREYHOUND CORP-EXTN-L.I. 
098MCC7513J EDW JARMAN APPLICATION 
099MCC0193HALE DISTRIBUTING CO INC 
099MCC1413WILLIS SHAW FRZN EXP CO 
099MCC2813C & H TRANSPORTATION CO 
099MCC3513HESS CARTAGE CO 
099MCC5913ARGO-COLLIER CORP-EXTN 
099MCC6683ALASKA TRUCK TRANSPORT 
100MCC0183WILLIS SHAW FRZN EXPRESS 
1OOMCC0343DEVON OWENS-CONTRACT APPL 
100MCC2706KERRVILLE TOURS-BROKER 
100MCC2796 TNM&O TOURS INC-BROKER 
100MCC3863W W HUGHES 
10OMCC4323MI.CHAUD BUS LINES EXTN 
1OOMCC 45 33GREYHOUND CORP V EDWARDS 
10OMCC4823BRASWELL FREIGHT LINES 
1OOMCC6653GREYHOUND LINES INC EXT 
101MCC4443OHIO SOUTHERN EXPRESS PUR 
101MCC5163HELPHREY MTR FRT-PURCHASE 
101MCC5 2 93 TRANSC ONTINENTAL-2 ACQUIS 
101MCC6553CARLSBAD CAVERN COACH 
101MCC7193EAZOR EXPRESS INC 
102MCC2673AMERICAN MVRS CONF ET AL 
102MCC2913CENTL FRT L V STRICKLAND 
102MCC4113ARMD CARRIER CORP-EXTN
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102MCC4293L0NG RANS CO-EXTN 
102MCC4573ZANTOP AIR TRANS-INVEST 
102MCC4923H. MESSICK INC EXTN 
102MCC5270AGRICULTURAL TRANS ASSN 
102MCC5773T I MCCORMACK TRKG CO 
103MCC0913MOSS TRKG INVESTIGATION 
103MCC1953ARROW LINES INC EXTENSION 
103MCC3073SUBLER MODIFICATION 
103MCC3183KINGPAK INC INVESTIGATION 
103MCC4833GRIFFIN MOBILE HOMES 
1Q3MCC7363W T MAYFIELD SONS TRKG CO 
103MCC7980CACHE VALLEY DAIRY ASSN 
103MCC9343JOE JONES JR CONTRACT CAR 
31CICC0671FRISCO LINE DIV3 REPORT 
310ICC0741NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
310ICC1021NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
31.0ICC4591B L 6c W DIV3 REPORT 
310ICC4631C B & Q,WABASH DIV3 REPT 
310ICC4651B & 0 RR DIV3 REPORT
310ICC5402B & M RR DIV3 REPORT
310ICC7911M K T RR DIV3 REPORT
311ICC0011NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
31IICC0541B 6c 0 RR DIV3 REPORT
311ICC1731B 6c M RR DIV3 REPORT
311ICC17 71SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT
311ICC1841NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC1891NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
3UICC2071SOPAC DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC2112C RI & P & C B &Q DIV3RPT 
311ICC2161D L 6c W RR DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC2291SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC2411SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC2461NYCRR DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC2491SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC3311SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC3371SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC3491SEABOARD DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC4691C M STP & P DIV3 REPORT 
311ICC4741B 6c M RR DIV3 REPORT 
313ICC1441M K T RR CO DIV3 REPORT 
313ICC1511C & El RR CO DIV3 REPORT 
313ICC2191NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
31.3ICC2251NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
313ICC2321READING DIV3 REPORT 
313ICC2391NYC RR DIV3 REPORT 
313ICC2651PENN RR IV3 REPORT 
31.4ICC2661C RT.& P RR DIV3 REPORT 
314ICC5611B 6c 0 RR, PENN RR, UNION DP 
315ICC0731N Y C RR CO DIV3 REPORT 
315ICC0991GREAT NORTHERN RWY DIV3 R
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315ICC3811PACIFIC ELECTRIC RWY DIV3 
315ICC6631LEHIGH VALLEY RR DIV3 RPT 
318ICC1517TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION 
318ICC1990ICC DIV3 REPT 
318ICC2298CUDAHY PACKING CO V AC&Y 
318ICC3011KCS,L&A,FRISCO ET AL 
318ICC3711L&N,ACL,SEABOARD ET AL 
318ICC3953GORDANS TRANSPORT 
318ICC4851ALL RAILROADS 
318ICC5673PITTSBURGH & NEW ENGLAND 
318ICC5893BRADY MOTORFRATE 
318ICC5933MIDDLE ATLANTIC CONE^ 
314ICC0460NATL MTR EQUIP EXCHANGE 
319ICC0839ELECTRIC BOAT V NYNH&H RR 
319ICC141OWESTERN GROWERS ET AL 
319ICC1827USA V OKLAHOMA-ADA-ATOKA 
319ICC2275SEA-LAND - GARDEN HOSE 
319ICC2353SCHWERMAN TRUCKING CO 
319ICC2573JIM TIONA JR-ANIMAL FEED 
319ICC3104SEA-TRAIN 
319ICC4314SEA-TRAIN -RWR- ALUMINUM 
319ICC6207CITY OF WILMINGTON V AGS 
319ICC6271B & 0
319ICC7111C RR NJ,NY & LB ET AL 
319ICC7531MONONGAHELA RWY CO DIV3 R
57
319ICC7820SUGAR 
320ICC1221SEABOARD-ACL MERGER 
320ICC3191PENN RR-DISCONTINUANCE 
320ICC6371OKMULGEE NORTHERN ABANDMT 
321ICC0171A C&cY V A T&SF 
321ICC1541SW FREIGHT BUREAU 
321ICC2831ACL V SOUTHERN 
321ICC3001B&M NYNH&H PENN V E CNTRL 
321ICC3141ACL V SOUTHERN 
321ICC3321WESTERN TRUNKLINE CARRIER 
321ICC3 911SOUTH-WESTERN CARRIERS 
3 21ICC4194SE ATRA.IN 
321ICC4731NYC-ERIE-LACHAWANA 
321ICC5190SOUTHEASTERN ASSN OF R&U 
321ICC5641C & EL 
321ICC5691MO PAC^T&P 
321ICC5821SOUTHERN
321ICC7263CENTRAL STATES MTR FRT B 
321ICC7387PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHRTY 
322ICC0010PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS 
322ICC1035FRANK P DOW INC EXTN 
322ICC1381C B & Q V C & E L E T A L  
322ICC2735FEDERAL SHIPPERS ASSN 
3 2.2ICC3010SUBSTITUTED SERVICE-TOFC 
322ICC4911A C&U RR V A T&SF RR
322ICC5290BRAZOS R HARBOR NAV DIST 
322ICC5413PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXP 
322ICC5600INCREASED SWITCHING CHARG 
322ICC3721B & 0 V C & .EL ET AL 
322ICC6201PULLMAN-STANDARD DIV3 RPT 
322ICC74300MAHA GRAIN EXCH V CB&Q 
323ICC0010POST OFFICE DEPT 
323ICC0753NATURAL GAS PIPELINE 
323ICC1312REPORTING STATISTICS 
323ICC1857ALA STATE DOCKS V AT&N RR 
3 23ICC2130STANISLAUS CTY V AT&SF RR 
323ICC4563CARDINALE TRKG CORP 
323ICC4681REA INVESTIGATION 
323ICC7931ERIE-LACKAWANNA DIV3 REPT 
3241CC0011N&W-STOCK ISSUEPWABASH 
324ICC2081MONON RR 
324ICC4604PITTSBURGH TOWING 
3 24IC C 7 5 01NORPAC-ABANDONMENT&CONS T 
325ICCOO11OFFICIAL & SOUTHERN RR 
325ICC1063MIDDLEWEST MTR FRT BUREAU 
325ICC1283MXLNE TRUCK LINE-INVEST. 
325ICC1383LEEWAY
325ICC1473MID-AMERICAN TRK LINES IN 
325ICC1631L & N RR DIV3-REPORT 
325ICC1681SO PAG CO DIV3 REP
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325ICC1883TERMINAL TRANSPORT CO INC 
325ICC3363DETENTION OF MTR VEH 
325ICC3691C P STP & P RR DIV3 REPT 
325ICC3 740BUREAU OF INQUIRY-DIV3 R 
325ICC4491NORFOLK SOUTHERN RR 
325ICC4583NATL MTR FRT TRAFFIC ASSN 
325ICC66 97STATE OF NY 
325ICC7220ICC- DIV3 REPORT 
325ICC7521SOUTHERN,L&N ET AL 
326ICC0063EASTCENTL MTR CARRIERS 
326ICC0771PENN& L&N-INGOT MOLDS 
326ICC2484BLACK NAVIGATION CO INC 
326ICC2623NATL MTR FRT TRAFFIC ASSN 
326ICC3581CMSTP&P GN ET■AL 
326ICC4153MID-WEST EMERY FRT SYSTEM 
326ICC4531NYCRR TOFC & SEC 4 APPLCN 
326ICC4835NATL ASSN FRT FWDRS 
326ICC5111CENTRAL AND SW RR ET AL 
326ICC7435DC ANDREWS & CO OF ILL. 
327ICCOI01BOSTON & PROVIDENCE REORG 
327ICC1511NY NH & H RR DISCONTINUE 
327ICC279IMQ PAC CONTROL OF C & EL 
327ICC3871WESPAC CONTROL OF W P RR 
327ICC4751PENN-CENTRAL MERGER 
328ICC2051DEPT OF JUSTICE ET AL
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328ICC2781CRI&P RR CO 
328ICC3041PENNCENTRAL MERGER 
328 ICC 34.51C ONTROL OF C PAC BY SPOAC 
328ICC3691NJ & NY RR E-L CONTROL 
328ICC4071ERIE LACKAWANA LOAN 
328ICC4601BURLINGTON-NORTHERN MERGE 
328ICC6841C&0 B&O CONTROL WEST MD 
329ICC0I71SAL V SOUTHERN 
329ICC0400STANISLAUS COUNTY V AT&SF 
329ICC0.61.3MTR CARRIERS TRAFFIC ASSN 
3 2 9ICC 16 71S OP AC & ST&SF RR-WINE 
329I.CC1993CHASE TRANSFER CORP 
329ICC2120CHICAGO -BOARD OF TRADE 
329ICC2661SEABOARD - DIV3 REPT 
329ICC2811B&0 AND W MD PAPER 
329ICC4113PRIVATE MTR CARRIERS-EXPL 
329ICC4203R.OCKY MTN MTR RATE BUREAU 
329ICC4381L & N RR CO - DIV 3 REPT 
329ICC4421ASSN OF AMERICAN RR-BRAKE 
329ICC4588CALCIUM CARBONATE CO V MP 
329ICC4661SOUTHERN RWY SYSTEM ALLWN 
329ICC5290CHICAG0 BOARD OF TRADE 
329ICC5398BIG RIVER INDUSTRIES 
329ICC5491N&W NYCRR ET AL 
329ICC6123MIDDLEWEST MTR FRT BUREAU
329ICC6690LK CHAS HARBOR &TERM DIST 
329ICC7423UNITED VAN LINES INC 
329ICC7861 SL-SF RR-FRISCO-ET AL 
329ICC8241C & NW,PILLSBURY CO ET AL 
329ICC8541CLASS I AND II RR
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BROWN,
BIOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL ON THE COMMISSIONERS STUDIED
VIRGINIA MAE 
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions
Military Service:
DEMOCRAT West Virginia
Pliny, West Virginia, November 13, 1923
High School graduate.
A.B., West Virginia University, 1942.
L.L.B., West Virginia University Law 
School, 1947.
High School Teacher, Law Clerk.
Executive Secretary, West Virginia 
Judicial Council, 1949.
Assistant Attorney General, West 
Virginia, 1952-1956.
Counsel to the Governor of West 
Virginia, 1961.
Insurance Commissioner, West Virginia, 
1961.
Public Service Commissioner, West 
Virginia, 1962.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1964 
- (Johnson).
None.
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BUSH, JOHN W.
Born:
Education:
Private Positions:
Political Positions:
Military Service:
DEMOCRAT Ohio
Columbus, Ohio, September 17, 1909.
High School graduate.
B.S. in B.A., Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute, 1931.
Standard Oil Co. of La., Arkansas Div., 
1932.
Gasoline Distributor, Portsmouth, Ohio, 
1937-1946 0
John W. Bush, Inc. (Tax & Business 
Consultants), 1957-1958
Director in two food processing 
concerns.
State Purchasing Agent, Ohio, 1949-1957
Director of Commerce, Ohio, 1959-1961.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1961 
(Kennedy).
None
DEASON, WILLARD
Born:
Education:
DEMOCRAT
Stockdale, Texas, January 3, 1905.
High School graduate.
B.S., Southwest Texas College, 1930. 
L.L.B.. San Antonio School of Law. 1934
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
Military Service:
FREAS', HOWARD G.
Born:
Education:
Private Positions:
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Junior High School Teacher, 1930-1934.
Employee, KTBC Radio Station, 1946-1949.
Manager, KVET Radio Station, 1949-1965.
Junior Attorney, Federal Land Bank, 
1934-1935.
National Youth Administration, 1935-1942.
Presidential Elector, 1960.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1965 
(Johnson).
Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, 1942-1946.
REPUBLICAN California
Fogelsville, Pennsylvania, July 13, 1900.
Graduate, Allentown Business College, 
191.6.
Graduate, Mecersburg Academy, 1921.
Attended University of Nevada, 1921-1922.
Attended University of California, 1922.
Attended La Salle University, 1934-1936.
Various positions with, railroads in
Pennsylvania and California, 1921-
1925.
Assistant Traffic Manager, 1925-1928.
Instructor, Stanford University, 1942-
1945.
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Political Positions
Military Service:
Employee, California Public Service 
Commission, 1928-1953.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1953 
(Ei senhower); Reappointed, 1960 
(Kennedy).
None
GOFF, ABE McGREGOR 
Born:
Education:
Private Positions:
Political Positions;
Military Service:
REPUBLICAN Idaho
Colfax, Washington, December 21, 1899. 
High School graduate.
L.L.B., University of Idaho Law College, 
• - 1924. • :
Private law practice, Moscow, Idaho,
1924.----------- ----
Prosecuting Attorney, Lattah City,
Idaho, 1926-1934.
State Senator.
U.S. Representative, 1st District of 
Idaho, 1947-1948.
General Counsel for the Post Office 
Department, 1954.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1958 
(Eisenhower).
Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 
U.S. Army, 1942-1946.
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HARDIN, DALE W. 
Born:
Education:
Private Positions:
Political Positions:
Military Service:
DEMOCRAT District of Columbia
Peoria, Illinois, September 9, 1922.
Attended Bradley University, 1941.
A.B. and A.A., George Washington 
University, 1949.
J.D., George Washington University Law 
School, 1951.
Private law practice, 1951.
Secretary to Counsel of the
Transportation Association of 
America, 1959.
Manager, Transportation and
Communications Department} U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, 1963-1966.
Special Agent, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1951-1954.
Attorney Advisor, Bureau of Finance;
Legislation Attorney; Congressional 
Liaison Officer; Interstate Commerce 
Commission Staff, 1954-1963.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1967 
(Johnson).
U.S. Marine Corps, 1942-1946.
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HERRING, CLYDE E. 
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
Military Service:
HUTCHINSON, EVERETT 
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
DEMOCRAT Idaho
Des Moines, Iowa, March 24, 1915.
High School graduate.
B.A., State University of Iowa, 1937. 
L.L.B., Drake University Law School, 
1940.
Private law practice, 1954-1959. 
Assistant City Attorney, 1945.
District Supervisor, U.S. Census, 1950. 
County Attorney, 1951-1954.
Democratic Candidate for Governor, 1954. 
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1959 
(Eisenhower).
Captain, Infantry, 1941-1945.
DEMOCRAT Texas
Hempstead, Texas, January 2, 1915.
High School graduate, Hempstead, Texas.
A.B. in B.A. , L.L.B., University of 
Texas, 1940.
Private law practice, 1940-1941, 1946- 
1949, 1951-1955.
Attorney for Texas Railroads, 1946-1949. 
Texas Legislature, 1941 and 1943. 
Assistant State Attorney General, 1949.
Military Service:
LEE, WILLIAM IRWIN 
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions
Military Service:
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Executive Assistant Attorney General and 
Legislative Assistant, 1950.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1955 
(E isenhower).
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval. Reserve, 
1942-1946.
REPUBLICAN Idaho
Madison County, North Carolina,
January 2/*, 1882.
High School graduate.
A.B., University of Idaho, 1903.
L.L.B., National University Law School.
None.
Private Secretary to Congressman,
B. L. French (R), Idaho.
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of 
Idaho, 1922.
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Idaho,
1926.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1930
(Hoover); Reappointed, 1931 (Hoover); 
Reappointed, 1939 (Roosevelt); 
Reappointed, 1945 (Truman).
Captain, Quartermaster Corps, U.S. Army, 
1917-1919.
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McPherson, donald p .
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
Military Service:
MINOR, ROBERT W.
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
REPUBLICAN Pennsylvania
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, October 6, 
1906.
Graduate, Gilman Country School.
B.A., Princeton University, 1928.
L.L.B., Harvard University Law School, 
1931.
Private law practice, 1934-1941.
Chairman, Adams City Ration Board, 1941- 
1944.
State Senator, 1948 and 1952.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1956 
(Eisenhower).
Lieutenant, U.S. Naval Reserve, 1944-
1946.
REPUBLICAN Ohio
Columbus, Ohio, December 15, 1919.
High School graduate, Columbus, Ohio.
A.B., Ohio State University, 1940.
J.D., Ohio State University Law School, 
1948
None.
Assistant Counsel, Senate Investigations 
Subcommittee, 1948-1949.
MURPHY,
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Administrative Assistant to Senator 
Bricker (R), Ohio, 1949-1953.
1st Assistant to Deputy U.S. Attorney 
General, 1953-1956.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1956 
(E isenhower).
Military Service: Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, 1941-1945.
RUPERT L. DEMOCRAT Georgia
Born: Byronsville, Georgia, July 27, 1909.
Education: High School graduate, 1925.
L.L.B., Atlanta Law School, 1938.
L.L.M., Atlanta Law School, 1939.
Private Positions: Correspondent and Rate Clerk, Atlanta
Freight Tariff Bureau, 1925-1929.
Assistant Freight Traffic Manager,
Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 1929- 
1942.
Attorney and Traffic Manager, Georgia-- 
Alabama Textile Traffic Association, 
1942-1955.
Political Positions: Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1955
. (E isenhower).
Military Service: None.
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SPLAWN, WALTER M. W. 
Born:
Education:
Private Positions:
Political Positions:
DEMOCRAT Texas
Arlington, Texas, June 16, 1883.
Attended Decatur College, 1904.
L.L.B., Baylor University, 1906.
B.A. and M.A. , Yale University,. 1908.
Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1916.
L.L.D., Howard Payne College.
University Instructor, 1906-1912.
Admitted to Texas Bar, 1909.
Professor of Social Sciences, Baylor 
University, 1916.
Dean, Baylor University, 1918.
Professor of Economics, University of 
Texas, 1919-1928.
President, University of Texas, 1924-1927.
Director of Research in Social Sciences, 
University of Texas, 1927-1928.
Dean, Graduate School, American
University, Washington, D. C., 1929.
Member of Railroad Commission of Texas, 
1924.
Chairman, Board of Arbitration of 
Western Railroads and Groups of 
Employees, 1927.
Military Service:
STAFFORD, GEORGE M„
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
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Referee under settlement of War Claims 
Act, 1920s.
Special Counsel to Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
House of Representatives, 71st 
Cong., 1930.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1934 
(Roosevelt); Reappointed, 1940 
(Roosevelt).
None.
REPUBLICAN Kansas
Valley Falls, Kansas, May 7, 1915.
Public Schools and Business College.
None.
Assistant Director, Kansas State Sales 
Tax Division, 1939-1941.
Campaign Manager for Carlson for 
Governor, 1946.
Executive Director, Republican State 
Committee, Kansas 1946.
Executive Secretary to Governor Carlson, 
-Kansas, 1946-1950.
Administrative Assistant to Senator 
Carlson (R), Kansas, 1950-1967.
Military Service:
TIERNEY, PAUL J.
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
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Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1967 
(Johnson).
Private to Captain, 1942-1945.
North Umberland, Pennsylvania, June 3, 
1916.
B.S., Georgetown College, 1938.
L.L.B., Georgetown University Law 
School, 1949.
None.
Employee, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 1939-1941.
Special Agent, Federal Bureau of ' 
Investigation, 1941-1953.
Member, Professional Staff,
Appropriations Committee, U.S. 
Senate, 1953-1955.
Assistant Counsel, Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Government 
Operations, 1955-1957.
Assistant Counsel and Administrative 
. Assistant to Chief Counsel, Senate 
Select Committee on Improper 
Activities in the Labor and
Military Service:
TUCKER, WILLIAM H.
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
Military Service:
TUGGLE, KENNETH H.
Born:
Education:
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Management Field, 1957-1959.
Returned to the Permanent Subcommittee, 
1959-1963.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1963 
(Kennedy).
None.
DEMOCRAT Massachusetts
Boston, Massachusetts, December 8, 1923. 
High School graduate, Roslindale, 
Massachusetts.
Attended Boston University, 1945-1947. 
L.'L.B., Boston University Law School, 
1949.
Private law practice, 1949-1961. 
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1961 
(Kennedy).
Sergeant, Airborne Infantry.
REPUBLICAN Kentucky
Barbourville, Kentucky, June 12, 1904. 
High School graduate.
B.A. , University of Kentucky, 1926. 
Attended University of Kentucky Law 
School.
L.L.D., Union College, 1947.
WALRATH
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Private Positions:
Political Positions
Military Service:
Private law practice, 1926-1953.
Chairman, Union National Bank.
Director in three companies.
City Attorney, Barbourville, Kentucky, 
1928-1932.
Lieutenant Governor, Kentucky, 1943-1947
President, State Senate, 1944-1946.
Member, Committee on Interstate 
Cooperation, 1944-1948.
Board of Managers, Council of State 
Governments, 1944-1947.
Member, Kentucky Committee on Resources 
and Functions of State Governments, 
1950-1952.
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1953 
(Eisenhower); Reappointed, 1955 
(E isenhower); Reappointed, 1963 
(Kennedy).
Colonel, Kentucky Militia.
LAURANCE IC. 
Born:
Education:
DEMOCRAT Florida
Meadville, Pennsylvania, August 16, 1909 
Attended Emory University Academy.
B.A., University of Florida, 1931.
L.L.B. and J.D., University of Florida
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
Military Service:
WEBB, CHARLES A.
Born:
Education:
Private Positions: 
Political Positions:
Military Service:
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Law School, 1934.
Private law practice, 1934-1956. 
Interstate Commerce Commissioner, 1956 
(Eisenhower).
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